Abstract: Public-key quantum money is a cryptographic protocol in which a bank can create quantum states which anyone can verify but no one except possibly the bank can clone or forge. There are no secure public-key quantum money schemes in the literature; as we show in this paper, the only previously published scheme [1] is insecure. We introduce a category of quantum money protocols which we call collision-free. For these protocols, even the bank cannot prepare multiple identicallooking pieces of quantum money. We present a blueprint for how such a protocol might work as well as a concrete example which we believe may be insecure.
Introduction
In 1969, Wiesner [10] pointed out that the nocloning theorem raises the possibility of uncopyable cash: bills whose authenticity would be guaranteed by quantum physics. 1 Here's how Wiesner's scheme works: besides an ordinary serial number, each bill would contain (say) a few hundred photons, which the central bank polarized in random directions when it issued the note. The bank remembers the polarization of every photon on every bill ever issued. If you want to verify that a bill is genuine, you take it to the bank, and the bank uses its knowledge of the polarizations to measure the photons. On the other hand, the No-Cloning Theorem ensures that someone who doesn't know the polarization of a photon can't produce more photons with the same polarizations. Indeed, copying a bill can succeed with probability at most (5/6) n , where n is the number of photons per bill. Despite its elegance, Wiesner's quantum money is a long way from replacing classical money. The main practical problem is that we don't know how to reliably store polarized photons (or any other coherent quantum state) for any appreciable length of time.
Yet, even if we could solve the technological problems, Wiesner's scheme would still have a serious drawback: only the bank can verify that a bill is genuine. Ideally, printing bills ought to be the exclusive prerogative of the bank, but the checking process ought to be open to anyone-think of a convenience-store clerk holding up a $20 bill to a light. But, with quantum mechanics, it may be possible to have quantum money satisfying all three requirements:
1. The bank can print it. That is, there is an efficient algorithm to produce the quantum money state.
cient measurement that anyone can perform that accepts money produced by the bank with high probability and minimal damage.
3. No one (except possibly the bank) can copy it. That is, no one other than the bank can efficiently produce states that are accepted by the verifier with better than exponentially small probability.
We call such a scheme a public-key quantum money scheme, by analogy with public-key cryptography. Such a scheme cannot be secure against an adversary with unbounded computational power, since a brute-force search will find valid money states in exponential time. Surprisingly, the question of whether public-key quantum money schemes are possible under computational assumptions has remained open for forty years, from Wiesner's time until today.
The first proposal for a public-key quantum money scheme, along with a proof that such money exists in an oracle model, appeared in [1] . We show in section 3 that the proposed quantum money scheme is insecure.
In this paper we introduce the idea of collisionfree quantum money, which is public-key quantum money with the added restriction that no one, not even the bank, can efficiently produce two identical-looking pieces of quantum money. We discuss the prospect of implementing collisionfree quantum money and its uses in section 2 below.
The question of whether secure public-key quantum money exists remains open.
Two kinds of quantum money
All public-key quantum money schemes need some mechanism to identify the bank and prevent other parties from producing money the same way that the bank does. A straightforward way of accomplishing this is to have the money consist of a quantum state and a classical description, digitally signed by the bank, of a circuit to verify the quantum state. Digital signatures secure against quantum adversaries are believed to exist, so we do not discuss the signature algorithm in the remainder of the paper.
Alternatively, if the bank produces a fixed number of quantum money states, it could publish a list of all the verification circuits of all the valid money states, and anyone could check that the verifier of their money state is in that list. This alternative is discussed further in section 2.2.
Quantum money with a classical secret
Public-key quantum money is a state which can be produced by a bank and verified by anyone. One way to design quantum money is to have the bank choose, for each instance of the money, a classical secret which is a description of a quantum state that can be efficiently generated and use that secret to manufacture the state. The bank then constructs an algorithm to verify that state and distributes the state and a description of the algorithm as "quantum money." We will refer to protocols of this type as quantum money with a classical secret.
The security of such a scheme relies on the difficulty of deducing the classical secret given both the verification circuit and a copy of the state.
A simple but insecure scheme for this type of quantum money is based on random product states. The bank chooses a string of n uniformly random angles θ i between 0 and 2π. This string is the classical secret. Using these angles, the bank generates the state |ψ = ⊗ i |θ i where |θ i = cos θ i |0 + sin θ i |1 and chooses a set of (say) 4-local projectors which are all orthogonal to |ψ . The quantum money is the state |ψ and a classical description of the projectors, and anyone can verify the money by measuring the projectors.
It is NP-hard to produce the state |ψ given only a description of the projectors, and given only the state, the no-cloning theorem states that the state cannot be copied. However, this quantum money is insecure because of a fully quantum attack [5] that uses a copy of the state and the description of the projectors to produce additional copies of the state. A more sophisticated example of quantum money with a classical secret is described in [1] . A different scheme was proposed Mosca and Stebila in [8] . The latter scheme requires a classical oracle that we do not know how to construct.
All quantum money schemes which rely on a classical secret in this way have the property, shared with ordinary bank notes and coins, that an unscrupulous bank can produce multiple pieces of identical money. Also, if there is a classical secret, there is the risk that some classical algorithm can deduce the secret from the verification algorithm (we show in section 3 that the scheme of [1] fails under some circumstances for exactly this reason).
Collision-free quantum money
An alternative kind of quantum money is collision-free. This means that the bank cannot efficiently produce two pieces of quantum money with the same classical description of the verification circuit. This rules out protocols in which the verification circuit is associated with a classical secret which allows the bank to produce the state. (For example, in the product state construction in the previous section, the set of angles would allow the bank to produce any number of identical pieces of quantum money.)
Collision-free quantum money has a useful property that even uncounterfeitable paper money (if it existed) would not have: instead of just digitally signing the verification circuit for each piece of money, the bank could publish a list describing the verification circuit of each piece of money it intends to produce. These verification circuits would be like serial numbers on paper money, but, since the bank cannot cheat by producing two pieces of money with the same serial number, it cannot produce more money than it says. This means that the bank cannot inflate the currency by secretly printing extra money.
We expect that computationally secure collision-free quantum money is possible. We do not have a concrete implementation of such a scheme, but in the next few sections, we give a blueprint for how a collision-free quantum money scheme could be constructed. We hope that somebody produces such a scheme which will not be vulnerable to attack.
Quantum money by postselection
Our approach to collision-free quantum money starts with a classical set. For concreteness, we will take this to be the set of n-bit strings. We need a classical function L that assigns a label to each element of the set. There should be an exponentially large set of labels and an exponentially large number of elements with each label. Furthermore, no label should correspond to more than an exponentially small fraction of the set. The function L should be as obscure and have as little structure as possible. The same function can be used to generate multiple pieces of quantum money. Each piece of quantum money is a state of the form
along with the label which is used as part of the verification procedure (N is the number of terms in the sum). The function L must have some additional structure in order to verify the state. Such a state can be generated as follows. First, produce the equal superposition over all n-bit strings. Then compute the function L into an ancilla register and measure that register to obtain a particular value . The state left over after measurement will be |ψ .
The quantum money state |ψ is the equal superposition of exponentially many terms which seemingly have no particular relationship to each other. Since no label occurs during the postselection procedure above with greater than exponentially small probability, the postselection procedure would have to be repeated exponentially many times to produce the same label twice. If the labeling function L is a black box with no additional structure, then Grover's lower bound rules out any polynomial time algorithm that can produce the state |ψ given only knowledge of . We conjecture that it is similarly difficult to copy a state |ψ or to produce the state |ψ ⊗ |ψ for any at all.
It remains to devise an algorithm to verify the money.
Verification using rapidly mixing Markov chains
The first step of any verification algorithm is to measure the function L to ensure that the state is a superposition of basis vectors associated with the correct label . The more difficult task is to verify that it is the correct superposition |ψ .
Our verification procedure requires some additional structure in the function L: we assume that we know of a classical Markov matrix M which, starting from any distribution over bit strings with the same label , rapidly mixes to the uniform distribution over those strings but does not mix between strings with different . This Markov chain must have a special form: each update must consist of a uniform random choice over N update rules, where each update rule is deterministic and invertible. We can consider the action of the operator M on the Hilbert space in which our quantum money lives (M is, in general, neither unitary nor Hermitian). Acting on states in this Hilbert space, any valid quantum money state |ψ is a +1 eigenstate of M and, in fact,
where the approximation is exponentially good for polynomially large r. This operator, when restricted to states with a given label , approximately projects onto the money state |ψ . After measuring the label as above, the final step of our verification procedure is to measure M r for sufficiently large r as we describe below. Even using the Markov chain M , we do not know of a general way to efficiently copy quantum money states |ψ . Any deterministic, invertible function corresponds to a permutation of its domain; we can write the Markov matrix as the average of N such permutations P i over the state space, where P i corresponds to the i th update rule. That is
We define a controlled update U of the state, which is a unitary quantum operator on two registers (the first holds an n-bit string and the second holds numbers from 1 to N )
Given some initial quantum state on n qubits, we can add an ancilla in a uniform superposition over all i (from 1 to N ). We then apply the unitary U , measure the projector of the ancilla onto the uniform superposition, and discard the ancilla. The Kraus operator sum element corresponding to the outcome 1 is
This operation can be implemented with one call to controlled-P i and additional overhead logarithmic in N . Repeating this operation r times, the Kraus operator corresponding to all outcomes being 1 is M r . The probability that all of the outcomes are 1 starting from a state |φ is M r |φ 2 and the resulting state is M r |φ / M r |φ 2 . If choose a large enough number of iterations r, we approximate a measurement of l |ψ ψ | as in eq. 1. This construction has the caveat that, if the outcomes are not all 1, the final state is not (1 − M r )|ψ . This can be corrected by deferring all measurements, computing an indicator of whether all outcomes were 1, and uncomputing everything else, but, as we do not care about the final state of bad quantum money, we do not need this correction.
An example of quantum money by postselection 2.3.1 Constructing a label function
One approach to creating the labeling function L from Sec. 2.2.1 is to concatenate the output of multiple single-bit classical cryptographic hash functions, 2 each of which acts on some subset of the qubits in the money state. We will describe such a scheme in this section, which has promising properties but is most likely insecure.
We start by randomly choosing √ n subsets of the n bits, where each bit is in 10 of the subsets. We associate a different binary valued hash function with each subset. The hash function associated with a particular subset maps the bits in that subset to either 0 or 1. The labeling function L is the √ n -bit string which contains the outputs of all the hash functions.
The bank can produce a random pair ( , |ψ ), where |ψ is the uniform superposition of all bit strings that hash to the values corresponding to the label , by using the algorithm in Sec. 2.2.1.
Verifying the Quantum Money
As in Sec. 2.2.2, we verify the money using a Markov chain. The update rule for the Markov chain is to choose a bit at random and flip the bit if and only if flipping that bit would not change the label (i.e. if all of the hash function that include that bit do not change value, which happens with roughly constant probability). This Markov chain is not ergodic, because there are probably many assignments to all the bits which do not allow any of the bits to be flipped. These assignments, along with some other possible assignments that mix slowly, can be excluded from the superposition, and the verification circuit may still be very close to a projector onto the resulting money state.
A weakness of this quantum money
A possible weakness of our hash-based labeling function as defined above is that the label is not an opaque value-the labels of two different bit strings are related to the difference between those strings. Specifically, the problem of finding strings that map to a particular label is a constraint satisfaction problem, and the Hamming distance between the label = L (x) and is the number of clauses that the string x violates.
We are concerned about the security of this scheme because it may be possible to use the structure of the labeling function to implement algorithms such as the state generation algorithm in [2], which, under certain circumstances, could be used to produce the money state. For example, consider a thermal distribution for which each bit string has probability proportional to e −βc(x) , where β is an arbitrary constant and c (x) is the number of clauses that the string x violates. If for all β we could construct a rapidly mixing Markov chain with this stationary distribution, then we could apply the state generation algorithm mentioned above. A naive Metropolis-Hastings construction that flips single bits gives Markov chains that are not rapidly mixing at high β, but some variants may be rapidly mixing. We do not know whether quantum sampling algorithms based on such Markov chains can run in polynomial time.
Due to this type of attack, and because we do not have a security proof, we do not claim that this money is secure.
3 Insecurity of a previously published quantum money scheme
The only currently published public-key quantum money scheme, an example of quantum money with a classical secret, was proposed in [1] .
We refer to this scheme as stabilizer money. We show that stabilizer money is insecure by presenting two different attacks that work in different parameter regimes. For some parameters, a classical algorithm can recover the secret from the description of the verification circuit. For other parameters, a quantum algorithm can generate states which are different from the intended money state but which still pass verification with high probability. Neither attack requires access to the original money state.
The stabilizer money is parametrized by integers n, m and l and by a real number ∈ [0, 1]. These parameters are required to satisfy
The quantum money state is a tensor product of l different stabilizer states, each on n qubits, and the classical secret is a list of Pauli group operators which stabilize the state. The bank generates an instance of the money by choosing a random stabilizer state for each of the l registers. To produce the verification circuit, the bank generates an m × l table of n qubit Pauli group operators. The (i, j)th element of the table is an operator
where each A ij k ∈ {1, σ x , σ y , σ z } and b ij ∈ {0, 1}. Each element E ij of the table is generated by the following procedure:
1. With probability 1 − choose the b ij and, for each k, A ij k uniformly at random. 2. With probability choose the operator E ij to be a uniformly random element of the stabilizer group of |C i .
To verify the quantum money state, for each i the authenticator chooses j (i) ∈ [m] at random and measures
The authenticator accepts iff the outcome is greater than or equal to 2 . Note that measuring the operator Q is equivalent to measuring the operator E i,j(i) for each register i ∈ [l] and then averaging the results, since the measurements on different registers commute. The state |C 1 |C 2 ...|C l is accepted by this procedure with high probability since the probability of measuring a +1 for the operator E i,j(i) on the state |C i is 1+ 2 . The mean value of the operator Q in the state |C 1 |C 2 ...|C l is therefore , since it is simply the average of the E i,j(i) for each register i ∈ [l]. The parameter l is chosen so that l 2 = Ω (n) so the probability that one measures Q to be less than 2 is exponentially small in n.
Our attack on this money depends on the parameter . Our proofs assume that m = poly(n), but we expect that both attacks work beyond the range in which our proofs apply.
Attacking the verification circuit for
and with high probability over the table of Pauli operators, we can efficiently generate a state that passes verification with high probability. This is because the verification algorithm does not project onto the intended money state but in fact accepts many states with varying probabilities. On each register, we want to produce a state for which the expected value of the measurement of a random operator from the appropriate column of E is sufficiently positive. This is to ensure that, with high probability, the verifier's measurement of Q will have an outcome greater than 2 . For small , there are many such states on each register and we can find enough of them by brute force.
We find states that pass verification by working on one register at a time. For each register i, we search for a state ρ i with the property that
(3) As we show in Appendix A, we can find such states efficiently on enough of the registers to construct a state that passes verification.
Recovering the classical secret for
We describe how to recover the classical secret (i.e. a description of the quantum state), and thus forge the money, when the parameter ≥ c √ m for any constant c > 0. We observe that each column of the table E contains approximately m commuting operators, with the rest chosen randomly, and if, in each column, we can find a set of commuting operators that is at least as large as the planted set, then any quantum state stabilized by these operators will pass verification.
We begin by casting our question as a graph problem. For each column, let G be a graph whose vertices correspond to the m measurements, and connect vertices i and j if and only if the corresponding measurements commute. The vertices corresponding to the planted commuting measurements now form a clique, and we aim to find it.
In general, it is intractable to find the largest clique in a graph. In fact, it is NP-hard even to approximate the size of the largest clique within n 1− , for any > 0 [11]. Finding large cliques planted in otherwise random graphs, however, can be easy.
For
, then a simple classical algorithm will find the clique. This algorithm proceeds by sorting the vertices in decreasing order of degree and selecting vertices from the beginning of the list as long as the selected vertices continue to form a clique.
We can find the planted clique for ≥ c √ m for any constant c > 0 in polynomial time using a more sophisticated classical algorithm that may be of independent interest. If the graph were obtained by planting a clique of size √ m in a random graph drawn from G(m, 1/2), Alon, Krivelevich, and Sudakov showed in [3] that one can find the clique in polynomial time with high probability.
3 Unfortunately, the measurement graph G is not drawn from G(m, 1/2), so we cannot directly apply their result. However, we show in appendix A that if G is sufficiently random then a modified version of their algorithm works.
Conclusions
Quantum money is an exciting and open area of research. Wiesner's original scheme is information-theoretically secure, but is not publickey. In this paper, we proved that the stabilizer construction for public-key quantum money [1] is insecure for most choices of parameters, and we expect that it is insecure for all choices of parameters. We drew a distinction between schemes which use a classical secret and those which are collision-free. We gave a blueprint for how a collision-free scheme might be devised. We described an illustrative example of such a scheme, but we have serious doubts as to its security.
It remains a major challenge to base the security of a public-key quantum money scheme on any previously-studied (or at least standard-looking) cryptographic assumption, for example, that some public-key cryptosystem is secure against quantum attack. Much as we wish it were otherwise, it seems possible that public-key quantum money intrinsically requires a new mathematical leap of faith, just as public-key cryptography required a new leap of faith when it was first introduced in the 1970s.
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Recall that each instance of stabilizer money is verified using a classical certificate, which consists of an m × l table of n qubit Pauli group operators. The (i, j)th element of the table is an operator
where each A ij k ∈ {1, σ x , σ y , σ z } and b ij ∈ {0, 1}.
We will use one important property of the algorithm that generates the table of Pauli operators: with the exception of the fact that −I ⊗n cannot occur in the table, the distribution of the tables is symmetric under negation of all of the operators.
The verification algorithm works by choosing, for each i, a random j (i) ∈ [m]. The verifier then measures
The algorithm accepts iff the outcome is greater than or equal to 2 . Note that measuring the operator Q is equivalent to measuring the operator E i,j(i) for each register i ∈ [l] and then averaging the results, since the measurements on different registers commute.
To better understand the statistics of the operator Q, we consider measuring an operator E i,j(i) on a state ρ i , where j(i) ∈ [m] is chosen uniformly at random. The total probability p 1 (ρ i ) of obtaining the outcome +1 is given by
where (for each i ∈ [l]) we have defined the Hamiltonian
We use the algorithm described below to independently generate an n qubit mixed state ρ i on each register i ∈ [l]. At least 1 /4 of these states ρ i (w.h.p. over the choice of the table E) will have the property that
and the rest have
which implies that
We use the state
as our forged quantum money. If the verifier selects j (i) at random and measures Q (from equation 4), then the expected outcome is at least . Before describing our algorithm to generate the states {ρ i }, we must understand the statistics (in particular, we consider the first two moments) of each H (i) on the fully mixed state I 2 n . We will assume that, for j = k, E ij = E ik . We also assume that the operators ±I ⊗ I ⊗ I... ⊗ I do not appear in the list. Both of these assumptions are satisfied with overwhelming probability. The first and second moments of
Now let us define f i to be the fraction (out of 2 n ) of the eigenstates of H (i) which have eigenvalues in the set [
]. Since the eigenvalues of H (i) are bounded between −1 and 1, we have
Plugging in equation 8 and rearranging we obtain
We also define g i to be the fraction of eigenstates of H (i) that have eigenvalues in the set [
The distribution (for any fixed i) of E ij as generated by the bank is symmetric under negation of all the E ij , so with probability at least 1 /2 over the choice of the operators in the row labeled by i, the fraction g i satisfies
We assume this last inequality is satisfied for at least 1 /4 of the indices i ∈ [l], for the particular table E ij that we are given. The probability that this is not the case is exponentially small in l. Ideally, we would generate the states ρ i by preparing the fully mixed state, measuring H (i) , keeping the result if the eigenvalue is at least 1 2 √ m , and otherwise trying again, up to some appropriate maximum number of tries. After enough failures, we would simply return the fully mixed state. It is easy to see that outputs of this algorithm would satisfy eq. 3 with high probability.
Unfortunately, we cannot efficiently measure the exact eigenvalue of an arbitrary Hermitian operator, but we can use phase estimation, which gives polynomial error using polynomial resources. In appendix A.2 we review the phase estimation algorithm which is central to our procedure for generating the states ρ i . In section A.1, we describe an efficient algorithm to generate ρ i using phase estimation and show that the resulting states, even in the presence of errors due to polynomialtime phase estimation, are accepted by the verifier with high probability, assuming that the table E ij has the appropriate properties.
A.1 Procedure to Generate ρ i
We now fix a particular value of i and, for convenience, define H = ]. Otherwise we say it is bad (which corresponds to the case where
, 1]). We use the following algorithm to produce a mixed state ρ i .
1. Set k = 1.
2. Prepare the completely mixed state I 2 n . In our analysis of this step, we will imagine that we have selected an eigenstate |ψ p of H uniformly at random, which yields identical statistics.
3. Use the phase estimation circuit to measure the phase of the operator e 2πiH . Here the phase estimation circuit (see appendix A.2) acts on the original n qubits in addition to q = r + log(2 + 
If k = m
2 + 1 then stop and output the fully mixed state. Otherwise go to step 2.
We have chosen the constants in steps 3 and 4 to obtain an upper bound on the probability p b of accepting a bad state in a particular iteration of steps 2, 3, and 4: p b = Pr (|ψ p is bad and you accept ) ≤ Pr (accept given that |ψ p was bad)
Above, we considered two cases depending on whether or not the inequality 9 is satisfied for the register i. We analyze the algorithm in these two cases separately.
Case 1: Register i satisfies inequality 9
In this case, choosing p uniformly,
This case occurs for at least 1 /4 of the indices i ∈ [l] with all but exponential probability. The probability p g that you pick a good state (in a particular iteration of steps 2, 3, and 4) and then accept it is at least p g = Pr (|ψ p is good and you accept)
, for m sufficiently large.
Thus the total probability of outputting a good state is (in a complete run of the algorithm)
for m sufficiently large.
So in this case, the state ρ i will satisfy
Case 2: Register i does not satisfy inequality 9
This case occurs for at most 3 /4 of the indices i ∈ [l] with all but exponentially small probability.
The probability of accepting a bad state for register i at any point is
So the state ρ i which is generated by the above procedure will satisfy
We have thus shown that equation 5 holds for all indices i which satisfy inequality 9 and that equation 6 holds for the rest of the indices. As discussed above, this guarantees (assuming at least 1 /4 of the indices i satisfy inequality 9) that our forged state ρ = ρ 1 ⊗ ρ 2 ⊗ ... ⊗ ρ l is accepted by the verifier with high probability if
A.2 Review of the Phase Estimation Algorithm
In this section we review some properties of the phase estimation algorithm as described in [9] . We use this algorithm in appendix A to measure the eigenvalues of the operator e 2πiH . The phase estimation circuit takes as input an integer r and a parameter δ and uses q = r + log(2 + 2 δ ) ancilla qubits. When used to measure the operator e 2πiH , phase estimation requires as a subroutine a circuit which implements the unitary operator e 2πiHt for t ≤ 2 r , which can be approximated efficiently if 2 r = poly(n). This approximation of the Hamiltonian time evolution incurs an error which can be made polynomially small in n using polynomial resources (see for example [9] ). We therefore neglect this error in the remainder of the discussion. The phase estimation circuit, when applied to an eigenstate |ψ j of H such that e 2πiH |ψ j = e 2πiφj |ψ j , and with the q ancillas initialized in the state |0 ⊗q , outputs a state |ψ j ⊗ |a j where |a j is a state of the ancillas. If this ancilla register is then measured in the computational basis, the resulting q bit string z will be an approximation to φ j which is accurate to r bits with probability at least 1 − δ in the sense that
In order for this algorithm to be efficient, we choose r and δ so that 2 r = poly(n) and δ = 1 poly(n) .
B Insecurity of the Stabilizer Money for
In this section, we will describe how to forge the Stabilizer Money when the number of commuting measurements is at least c √ m for any constant c > 0. We will consider each column of the table separately. For the i th column, let M = M i be the list of possible measurements for ψ = ψ i , and let K = K i denote the set of commuting measurements that stabilize ψ. Set k = |K| and m = |M |. We will first consider the case k > 100 √ m, and we will then show how to reduce the case k > c √ m to this case for any constant c > 0. The algorithm we present has success probability 4/5 over the choice of the random measurements. We have not attempted to optimize this probability, and it could be improved with a more careful analysis.
We begin by casting our question as a graph problem. Let G be a graph whose vertices correspond to the m measurements, and connect vertices i and j if and only if the corresponding measurements commute. The set K now forms a clique, and we aim to find it.
In general, it is intractable to find the largest clique in a graph. In fact, it is NP-hard even to approximate the size of the largest clique within n 1− , for any > 0 [11]. However, if the graph is obtained by planting a clique of size √ m in an (Erds-Rnyi) random graph drawn from G(m, 1/2), Alon, Krivelevich, and Sudakov showed that one can find the clique in polynomial time with high probability [3] . Unfortunately, the measurement graph G is not drawn from G(m, 1/2), so we cannot directly apply their result. However, we shall show that G is sufficiently random that a modified version of their approach can be made to go through. The main tool that we use is to show that G is k-wise independent and that this is enough for a variant of the clique finding algorithm to work. k wise independent random graphs were studied by [4] , although they were interested in other properties of them.
B.1 Properties of the Measurement Graph
To analyze G, it will be convenient to use a linear algebraic description of its vertices and edges. Recall that any stabilizer measurement on n qubits can be described as a vector in F 2n 2 as follows:
• for j ≤ n, set the j th coordinate to 1 if and only if the operator restricted to the j th qubit is X or Y , and • for n < j ≤ 2n, set the j th coordinate to 1 if and only if the operator restricted to the (j − n) th qubit is Y or Z.
where I n and 0 n are the n×n identity and all-zeros matrices, respectively. It is easy to check that the stabilizer measurements corresponding to v and w commute if and only if v, w = 0 (over F 2 ). Using this equivalence between Pauli group operators and vectors, each vertex u of the graph G is associated with a vector s u . There is an edge between vertices u and v in G if and only if s u , s v = 0. This means that the 2mn bits that encode the vectors {s u } also encode the entire adjacency matrix of G. There are m (m − 1) /2 possible edges in G, so the distribution of edges in G is dependent (generically, m (m − 1) /2) > 2mn). Fortunately, this dependence is limited, as we can see from the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let v 1 , . . . v t , u be measurements such that s v1 , . . . s vt , s u are linearly independent, and let x 1 , . . . , x t ∈ {0, 1} be arbitrary. Let v be a random stabilizer measurement such that s v , s vi = x i for every i and the vectors s v1 , . . . , s vt , s u , s v are linearly independent. Then
2n is chosen uniformly at random from the set of vectors satisfying the following constraints:
1. For every i, we have s v , s vi = x i .
2. The vectors s v1 , . . . s vt , s u , s v are linearly independent.
Let S 0 denote the set of vectors that satisfy these constraints and have s v , s u = 0, and let S 1 be the set of vectors that satisfy these constraints and have s v , s u = 1. We have
The vectors s v1 , . . . s vt , s u are linearly independent, so there are 2 2n−t−1 solutions to the set of equations s v , s u = 1 and s v , s vi = x i for all i. This implies that |S 1 | ≤ 2 2n−t−1 . Constraint 2 rules out precisely the set of vectors in the span of s v1 , . . . , s vt , s u . This is a (t + 1)-dimensional subspace, so it contains 2 t+1 points, and thus |S 0 | ≥ 2 2n−t−1 − 2 t+1 . It follows that
Repeating this argument gives the same bound for Pr( s v , s u = 1), from which the desired result follows.
B.2 Finding Planted Cliques in Random Graphs
Our algorithm for finding the clique K will be identical to that of Alon, Krivelevich, and Sudakov [3] , but we will need to modify the proof of correctness to show that it still works in our setting. In this section, we shall give a high level description of [3] and explain the modifications necessary to apply it to G. The fundamental difference is that Alon et al. rely on results from random matrix theory that use the complete independence of the matrix entries to bound mixed moments of arbitrarily high degree, but we only have guarantees about moments of degree O(log m). As such, we must adapt the proof to use only these lower order moments.
Let G(m, 1/2, k) be a random graph from G(m, 1/2) augmented with a planted clique of size k, and let A be its adjacency matrix. Let λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ m be the eigenvalues of A, and let v 1 , . . . , v m be the corresponding eigenvectors. To find the clique, Alon et al. find the set W of vertices with the k largest coordinates in v 2 . They then prove that, with high probability, the set of vertices that have at least 3k/4 neighbors in W precisely comprise the planted clique.
The analysis of their algorithm proceeds by analyzing the largest eigenvalues of A. They begin by proving that the following two bounds hold with high probability:
• λ 1 ≥ 1 2 + o(1) m, and
√ m for all i ≥ 3. The second of these bounds relies heavily on a result by Fredi and Komls about the eigenvalues of matrices with independent entries. The independence assumption will not apply in our setting, and thus we will need to reprove this bound for our graph G. This is the main modification that we will require to the analysis of [3] .
They then introduce a vector z that has z i = (m − k) when vertex i belongs to the planted clique, and has z i = −k otherwise. Using the above bounds, they prove that, when one expands z in the eigenbasis of A, the coefficients of v 1 , v 3 , . . . , v m are all small compared to ||z||, so z has most of its norm coming from its projection onto v 2 . This means that v 2 has most of its weight on the planted clique, which enables them to prove the correctness of their algorithm.
Other than the bound on λ 3 , . . . , λ m , the proof goes through with only minor changes. The bound on λ 1 = (1 + o(1))m/2, follows from a simple analysis of the average degree, which holds for the measurement graph as well. The rest of their proof does not make heavy use of the structure of the graph. The only change necessary is to replace various tail bounds on the binomial distribution and Chebyschev bounds with Markov bounds. These weaker bounds result in a constant failure probability and weaker constants, but they otherwise do not affect the proof. (For brevity, we omit the details.) As such, our remaining task is to bound λ i for i ≥ 3. Lemma 2. Let R be a random symmetric m × m matrix in which R i,i = 0 for all i, and the other entries are independently set to ±1 with Pr(R i,j = 1) = Pr(R i,j = −1) = 1 2 . The largest eigenvalue of R is at most m+O(m 1/3 log m) with high probability.
We will prove a slightly weaker variant of this lemma for random measurement graphs. Let B be a matrix that is generated by picking m random stabilizer measurements M 1 , . . . , M m and setting B i,i = 0, B i,j = 1 if M i commutes with M j , and B i,j = −1 if M i anticommutes with M j . The main technical result of this section will be the following:
Theorem 3. With high probability, the largest eigenvalue of B is at most 10 √ m.
Alon et al. [3] show how to transform a bound on the eigenvalues of R into a bound on the third largest eigenvalue of A. This reduction does not depend on the properties of G, and it works in our case when applied to B. This gives a bound of 10 √ m on the third largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of G.
The proof of Theorem 3 will rely on the following lemma, which shows that the entries of small powers of the matrix B have expectations quite close to those of R.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 4] With high probability, for every subset of vertices U such that |U | < t ≤ O(log m), we have that the set {s u | u ∈ U } is linearly independent over F 2 . We condition the rest of our analysis on this high probability event.
We begin by expanding the quantity we aim to bound:
where we take set 1 = i and t+1 = j, and we sum over all possible values of the indices 2 , . . . , t .
We break the nonzero terms in this summation into two types of monomials: those in which every matrix element appears an even number of times, and those in which at least one element appears an odd number of times. In the former case, the monomial is the square of a ±1-valued random variable, so we have
and it suffices to focus on the latter case. By the same reasoning, we can drop any even number of occurrences of an element, so it suffices to estimate the expectations of monomials of degree at most t in which all of the variables are distinct.
Any such monomial in the R i,j has expectation zero by symmetry, so we need to provide an upper bound on terms of the form q α=1 B α , α+1 , where q ≤ t ≤ r and each matrix element appears at most once.
Consider the probability that B q−1,q = 1, where we take the probability over the choice of the 2n bit string s q , given that for any α ≤ q, we have B α,α+1 = x α for some value x α . We are computing this expectation conditioned on the the s u being linearly independent, so we can apply Pr( s α , s α+1 = x α ) =O 1 2 2(n−t) .
There are n O(log m) terms in the summation of eq. , and we have shown that each term is at most O 1/2 2(n−t) , so we obtain
2 2(n−t) = 1 2 Ω(n) , as desired.
We can now use this lemma to prove Theorem 3.
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 3] Consider a random matrix R, with R i,i = 0 and each other cell distributed independently at random according to Pr(R i,j = 1) = Pr(R i,j = −1) = 1 2 . Lemma 3.2 of [7] shows that, for t < m 1/3 , Tr(E(R t )) = m t/2+1 4 t .
For t ≥ 10 log m, Lemma 4 implies that
Tr(E(B t )) = Tr(E(R t )) ± 1 2 Ω(n−t) = m t/2+1 4 t ± 1 2 Ω(n−t) . Let λ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ n be the eigenvalues of B. For any even t, one has that
Applying this relation with t = 10 log m gives:
Pr(λ 1 ≥ 10 √ m) = Pr λ The procedure used by Alon et al. is to iterate over all sets of vertices of size log(100/c), and, for each such set S, to try to find a clique in the graph G S of the vertices that are connected to all of the vertices in S.
When S is in the planted clique, G S also contains the clique. However, |G S | ≈ c|G|/100, as most of the vertices that are outside the clique are removed. As G S behaves like a random graph with the same distribution as the original graph but with a planted clique of size 100 |G S |, one can find it using the second largest eigenvector.
To use the same algorithm in our case, we apply Lemma 4 with parameter k + log 100/c. This shows that, up to a small additive error, the expected value of the k th power of the adjacency matrix of G S behaves like the expected value of the k th power of the adjacency matrix of a random graph, which was all that we used in the proof.
